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Liberty v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty 
Marc D. Stern* 
¶1 In other forums, I have taken the position that the state should recognize same-sex 
marriage even as it protects religious liberty.1  I have also, by signing a letter drafted by 
Professors Robin Wilson, Thomas Berg, and others,2 indicated my support for generous 
protection of the religious liberty of those who oppose same-sex marriage.  In this letter, 
we proposed that recognition of religious liberty be a part of same-sex marriage 
legislation pending in several states.  This was a joint proposal, and, as is the nature of 
such things, it was difficult to reach complete agreement on every detail.  The point was 
to establish a broad draft statute addressing the conflict that has arisen between the right 
to same-sex marriage and the right to religious freedom, and to provide a template for 
legislation that can adequately deal with the issue.  Our suggestion for a statute applying 
to all marriages, but in practical terms relevant only to same-sex marriages, ran: 
No individual, no religious or denominational organization, and no 
charitable or educational organization which is operated, supervised, or 
controlled by or connected with a religious organization, shall be liable, 
penalized, or denied benefits under the laws of this state or any 
subdivision of this state, including but not limited to laws regarding 
employment discrimination, housing, public accommodations, licensing, 
government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status, for refusing to 
provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or 
privileges related to the solemnization of any marriage, for refusing to 
solemnize any marriage, or for refusing to treat as valid any marriage, if 
such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such 
individuals or organizations to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs, 
provided that 
(a) a refusal to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
goods, or privileges related to the solemnization of any marriage shall not 
be protected under this section where (i) a party to the marriage is unable 
to obtain any similar services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
goods, or privileges elsewhere, and (ii) such inability to obtain similar 
                                                 
* Marc D. Stern is acting Co-Executive Director and General Counsel of the American Jewish Congress 
and Director of its Commission on Law, Social Justice, and Intergroup Relations.  The views expressed 
here are his own. 
1 Marc D. Stern, Op-ed, Will Gay Rights Trample Religious Freedom?, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 2008, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/17/opinion/oe-stern17; Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor of Law, 
University of St. Thomas School of Law, et al., to John Lynch, Governor, New Hampshire (May 1, 2009), 
available at http://www.mirror-of-justice.blogs.com/files/letter-to-gov.-lynch-re-h.b.-436-1.pdf. 
2 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, et al., 
to John Baldacci, Governor, Maine (Oct. 5, 2009), available at 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/wilson-et-al-to-governor-maine-100509.pdf. 
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services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges 
elsewhere constitutes a substantial hardship; and 
(b) no government employee may refuse to assist in the solemnization of 
any marriage under this section if another government employee is not 
available and willing to do so. 
¶2 Some of the proposed statute’s provisions are easily defended, such as exempting 
religious agencies from the requirement to recognize same-sex marriage.  At the same 
time, the provision prohibiting the denial of government funding to institutions that do 
not recognize same-sex marriage can be questioned, or the provision allowing an 
exemption to corporations can be limited to apply only to small, closely held corporations 
without serious harm to religious liberty.   
¶3 The proposal is ambiguous on some points.  For instance, are individuals who do 
business in corporate form protected (and, if so, what size corporations would be 
protected)?  Or, do only those acting in an individual capacity fall within the statute?  
While beyond the scope of this Article, this and other issues deserve to be discussed in 
detail and may plausibly and reasonably be debated. 
¶4 In this Article, I will attempt to put the arguments in a larger framework.  First I 
will introduce the topic by providing the background of the debate, including the basis for 
religious liberty protection and the practical importance of enshrining such protection in 
any same-sex marriage legislation.  Then, I will demonstrate that the ability to claim 
religious protection depends largely upon whether the issue of same-sex marriage is 
framed as one of equality or personal liberty.  Next, I will explore the argument proposed 
by some for the privatization of religion—that religion has no place in the public sphere.  
Finally, I will briefly discuss the argument for moral autonomy.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶5 While the details of any such statute invite debate, the general principle of the 
proposed statute above—that religious accommodation is necessary—should not be 
debatable.  Recognition of same-sex marriage, whatever technical form legal arguments 
made on its behalf take, exemplifies a “live and let live” policy.  That same policy should 
apply equally to religious believers who oppose same-sex marriage—they should not be 
required to act directly in opposition to their religious beliefs, that is, in ways that appear 
to confer their personal blessing on such marriages.  While such exemptions are 
necessary, there are probably far fewer people around who would invoke such 
exemptions than is generally thought.  And, given the poll data,3 there will be even fewer 
as older people move off the commercial scene. 
¶6 That recognizing same-sex marriage will, for the while, put many people with 
“traditional” religious beliefs4 in a vise between their religious commitments and the law 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Press Release, Quinnipiac University, Same Sex Marriage Loses Support in New Jersey, 
Quinnipiac University Poll Finds (Nov. 25, 2009), http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=1400; 
Support for Same-Sex Marriage By Age & State, http://contexts.org/socimages/2009/11/05/support-for-
same-sex-marriage-by-age-and-state (Nov. 5, 2009, 10:01 PST). 
4 I use the term “traditional beliefs” to refer to those whose religion requires the belief that marriage should 
only be between a man and a woman. 
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is really not open to serious question.  Just as traditional believers too often slight the 
harm done to gays when they are denied access to marriage and its benefits, so too do 
advocates of same-sex marriage slight the interference with religious practice that the 
recognition of same-sex marriage will inevitably bring about.  
¶7 Proponents of same-sex marriage deny that recognizing same-sex marriage will 
impose any costs on religious liberty because religious leaders and institutions would not 
be required to perform or host same-sex marriage ceremonies,5 a proposition echoed by 
both the California and Iowa decisions recognizing same-sex marriage.  Some even deny 
that a conflict exists between religious liberty and recognition of same-sex marriage.  
This denial is particularly irritating given the increasing number of cases arising from the 
clash between same-sex marriage (or civil unions) and traditional religious practices here 
and abroad.6 
¶8 The issue of whether or not there is a conflict between religion and same-sex 
marriages was debated in Maine, where a referendum held last fall invalidated legislation 
recognizing same-sex marriage.7  Opponents of same-sex marriage argued, inter alia, that 
the legislation should be overturned because of its impact on religious liberty.8  That 
argument would have been denied them had the original legislation provided meaningful 
religious liberty protection.  The issue of religious liberty clashes with same-sex marriage 
also helped fuel the passage of Proposition 8 in California.9 
¶9 In many states where same-sex marriage is on the legislative table, proponents of 
same-sex marriage have vigorously opposed any religious exemption beyond the 
religious institution ceremony provision.10  In New Hampshire, for example, the governor 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Dan Gilgoff, Conservative Activists Argue Gay Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 2, 2010, 
http://politics.usnews.com/news/religion/articles/2009/05/19/conservative-activists-argue-gay-marriage-
threatens-religious-liberty.html; Maine Same Sex Marriage People’s Veto, Question 1 (2009), 
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Maine_Same-
Sex_Marriage_People%27s_Veto,_Question_1_%282009%29 (last visited July 1, 2010).   
 The tenor of the debate can be gathered from Professor Geoffrey Stone’s argument that California’s 
Proposition 8 is an establishment of religion because people with traditional religious beliefs were essential 
to its passage, and his labeling of the opposition as “self-righteous” and “prejudiced.”  Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Democracy, Religion & Proposition 8, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 15, 2008, 
http//:www.huffingtonpost.com/geofrey_r_stone/democracy_religion_and_ pr_b_144103.  
6 Various articles compile these cases.  See, e.g., Marc D. Stern, Same-Sex Marriage and the Churches, in 
SAME SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 1 (Douglas Laycock, et al., eds., 
2008); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 274 (2010); ANDREW KOPPELMAN & GEORGE W. DENT, JR., MUST GAY RIGHTS CONFLICT 
WITH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY? (forthcoming 2010). 
7 Maine Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Law, CNN.com, Nov. 4, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/04/maine.same.sex/index.html. 
8 Robin F. Wilson, Op-ed, Same Sex Marriage Law Lacks Religious Protection, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, 
Oct. 17, 2009, http://www.bangordailynews.com/detail/125681.html (the “blogged” comments which 
follow).  
9 Proposition 8 is now codified at CAL. CONST. art I, § 7.5.  I am not suggesting that religious liberty was 
the primary concern motivating supporters of Proposition 8, just that it was a concern. 
10 Greg Kesich, Religious Institutions Don’t Need Protection from Same-Sex Marriage, PORTLAND PRESS 
HERALD, May 27, 2009, at A6; Chistian Ehret, New Hampshire House Rejects Amended Same-Sex 
Marriage Bill, JURIST, May 21, 2009, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2009/05/new-hampshire-house-
rejects-amended.php; Posting of Thomas Berg to Mirror of Justice Blog, 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/10/page/13/ (Oct. 5, 2009, 12:48 EST); Posting of 
Emma Ruby-Sachs to 365Gay Agenda Blog, http://www.365gay.com/blog/ruby-sachs-new-hampshire-
governor-worried-about-religious-freedom/ (May 15, 2009, 10:38 EST) (noting that exemption sought by 
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had insisted on broad religious liberty protection as a condition for signing same-sex 
marriage legislation.11  The legislature originally complied, including protection that 
roughly followed what the proposed statute above urges.  But, under intense pressure 
from proponents of same-sex marriage, the legislature retreated to a far narrower and 
mostly meaningless protection for religious institutions.12  The governor did not insist on 
the original version, and now the New Hampshire statute legalizes same-sex marriage at 
the expense of religious liberty.13  
¶10 Given the number of real, litigated conflicts, the claim that there are no such 
conflicts is factually untenable.  I suspect that the refusal to consider religious liberty 
claims is in part fueled by anger at some of the more outrageous statements about gays 
made by religious leaders over the years.  Or, perhaps, the denial of the existence of a 
problem is intended only to shift the focus of the debate to where proponents of same-sex 
marriage prefer to have it focused, because their policy arguments are stronger than the 
arguments about religious exemptions. 
II. LIBERTY V. EQUALITY 
A. The Legal Arguments 
¶11 As a matter of current First Amendment doctrine, there is much force to the claim 
that there is no legally important clash between religious liberty and equal recognition of 
same-sex marriage.  The controlling case in this area is Employment Division v. Smith,14 
in which the Supreme Court held that facially neutral, generally applicable laws 
burdening religion need no special legislative justification and, therefore, would not be 
subject to compelling (or other heightened) interest analysis.15  Laws that mandate the 
acceptance of the validity of same-sex marriage would be neutral laws of general 
applicability and, hence, would require no special justification to satisfy the federal 
constitutional guarantee of free exercise of religion.  On the other hand, such indirect 
burdens on religious practices might violate state constitutional religious liberty 
guarantees in those states departing from the rule introduced in Smith.  
                                                                                                                                                 
the governor would encourage homophobia, and that equality for gays has never interfered with religious 
liberty). 
11 John Lynch, Governor, New Hampshire, Statement on Same-Sex Marriage Bill (May 14, 2009), 
available at http://www.nhpr.org/ node/24894. 
12 See Wilson, supra note 8. 
13 The fight is not confined to the same-sex marriage context.  Efforts to protect religious liberty generally 
in many legislative forums have been blocked unless they contain an exclusion for gay civil rights claims. 
14 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
15 For an example of application of the compelling interest test under state religious freedom acts, modeled 
on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006), see State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 
1004 (Ariz. 2009) (involving religiously mandated use of controlled substances).  For a federal case under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, see Gonzales v. Centro Espiritu Beneficente Unicio de Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418 (2006) (involving religiously mandated use of controlled substances).   
 New York applies a modified Smith rule, but one of uncertain scope.  See Catholic Charities of 
Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006).  For cases rejecting Smith’s neutrality rule on 
state constitutional grounds, see Attorney General v. Desilets, 636 N.E. 233 (Mass. 1994) (retaining 
existing compelling interest standard); Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School, 487 
N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992) (same). 
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¶12 Federal statutes, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act16 or the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act,17 and state equivalents, require accommodation of religious practices in 
some contexts regardless of the facial neutrality of a law or policy.18  Other constitutional 
provisions—namely the freedom of association as applied in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale,19 and the freedom of speech as in the public school context20—support religious 
accommodation as well.  These provisions cover some of the same ground that the Free 
Exercise Clause used to cover, although freedom of association claims will have little 
traction in the business context.  
¶13 Despite this legal support for the position that there is compulsion to accommodate, 
I do not think opponents of a broad protection for religious liberty are at bottom making a 
legal claim; rather, they are making a policy argument.  They are arguing that the equality 
interests behind same-sex marriage trump the liberty interests behind a religious 
exemption. 
¶14 The argument that, as a matter of policy, there are no legitimate religious liberty 
claims to be made makes little or no sense if one conceives of the right to same-sex 
marriage as rooted in personal liberty.  On the other hand, it makes substantial sense if 
the argument for same-sex marriage is rooted primarily in a claim about equality.  
¶15 If the argument for same-sex marriage is rooted in personal liberty (“I can love 
whom I want without state interference,” or “so long as no else is hurt, the state should 
not regulate my private actions”), one has to confront the fact that liberty to marry whom 
one chooses often will conflict with other personal liberties, notably religious freedom (“I 
can serve God as I please”), freedom of non-association (“I can serve whom I want”), 
and, in some cases, freedom of speech (“I can state my opinions on same-sex marriage 
without interference”).  One would be hard-pressed to argue that the liberty right to same-
sex marriage should unfailingly trump those other liberty rights.  No principle of liberty 
that I can imagine would lead to a rigid preference for one liberty right over all others. 
¶16 If, however, same-sex marriage rights are rooted not primarily in liberty, as early 
challenges to sodomy laws were,21 but in the right to equal treatment, as most 
contemporary efforts to legalize same-sex marriage are,22 then the claim that individual 
                                                 
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
17 Id. § 2000bb. 
18 See Buonanno v. AT&T Broadband, 313 F.Supp.2d 1069 (D. Colo. 2004).  In Buonanno, an employer 
required all employees to sign a pledge to respect the sexual choices of their fellow employees.  Plaintiff 
refused and was fired.  He successfully sued under Title VII’s religious accommodation provisions.  The 
rule requiring the signing of the pledge was neutral and generally applicable, but it failed to meet even the 
low standard of justification excusing religious accommodation. 
19 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the right to freedom of association allows Boy Scouts to discharge gay 
scoutmaster). 
20 Compare Harper v. Poway Unified School Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 549 
U.S. 1262 (2007) (holding that the school may ban anti-gay speech in interest of protecting gay students 
from insult), with Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie School Dist., 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the state 
has no legitimate interest in protecting people from critical speech). 
21 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579–85 (2006) (invalidating sodomy law on liberty grounds, 
though Justice O’Connor, concurring, would have rested on equal protection theories); Powell v. State, 510 
S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (holding based on the right to privacy); Corn v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) 
(same, but including equal protection); Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (holding 
based on the right to privacy). 
22 See, e.g., In Re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 
2009). 
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liberty claims cannot trump an equality claim makes sense.  Equal citizenship claims 
stand on a different plane than bare claims of religious liberty.  
B. Liberty v. Equality in Practice 
¶17 The right to equality has been defined as the most fundamental claim a citizen has 
against government: the right to be held in equal regard and to be treated equally by the 
government.23  Rights are created by equal citizens, not privileged ones.  
¶18 A statute authorizing private departures from the equal treatment mandated by 
foundational law could itself be seen as a departure from the guarantee of equal status 
before the government.  A fortiori, allowing government officials to discriminate against 
citizens by refusing to solemnize their weddings would offend the duty of treating 
citizens equally and according them equal dignity.  Even if equality claims ran only 
against the government, the government could be guilty of sanctioning inequality by 
virtue of statutes that authorize private discrimination based on religious objections to 
same-sex marriage.  
¶19 In England, for example, where equality is of cardinal importance in current legal 
and political discourse, religious liberty claims to the right not to treat gays equally have 
uniformly faired poorly.24  The Charities Commission, a not-for-profit watchdog group, 
has cast a highly jaundiced eye on sexual orientation discrimination by charities.25  There 
is an effort underway to require parochial schools to teach that same-sex relationships are 
normal,26 and a Catholic parochial school was not allowed to fire a headmaster (a 
principal for us colonials) who was in a same-sex relationship.27  The Sexual Orientation 
Equality Act (passed in 2007) has a most limited exception for religious groups.28  Efforts 
to broaden the exemption were successfully challenged, over Prime Minister Blair’s 
objections, as an intolerable departure from the principle of equality,29 and even that 
                                                 
23 See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
24 The cases are collected in Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government 
Employee Exemptions, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 319, 324 nn.19–24.  
25 See, e.g., In the Matter of Appeal to Charity Tribunal, Catholic Diocese of Leeds v. Charity Commission 
[2009] UKFTT 376, available at 
http://www.charity.tribunal.gov.uk/documents/decisions/CatholicCareDecision1609v2.pdf; Jessica Geen, 
Catholic Adoption Charity to challenge gay ruling in High Court, PINK NEWS, Oct. 14, 2009, 
http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2009/10/14/catholic-adoption-charity-to-challenge-gay-ruling-in-the-high-
court/ (reporting on challenge to ruling that Catholic charity could not refuse same-sex adoption 
placement). 
26 See Tim Ross, Ed Balls to Let Faith Schools Teach Homosexuality is Wrong, LONDON EVENING 
STANDARD, Feb. 23, 2010, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23808956-ed-balls-to-let-faith-
schools-teach-homosexuality-is-wrong.do.  Such schools are now permitted, somewhat vaguely, to address 
sexual issues from the point of view of faith. 
27 See, e.g., Peter Smith, Nothing We Can Do Says Liverpool Diocese about Openly Gay Headmaster, 
LIFESITE NEWS, Aug. 13, 2007, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2007/aug/07081303.html.  
28 Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations, 2007, 2007 No. 1263 (U.K.).  The relevant provisions are 
§§ 13, 14, and 15. 
29 Matthew Tempest, No. 10 Mulls Catholic Opt-Out From Gay Rights Law, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 23, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/jan/23/immigrationpolicy.religion; Rachel Sylvester, Blair Moves 
to Head off Row Over Religion, THE TELEGRAPH, June 26, 2000, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1345007/Blair-moves-to-head-off-row-over-religion.html; Tony 
Blair’s Embarrassing Gay Adoptions Climb Down After Cabinet Revolt, 
http://direland.typepad.com/direland/2007/01/tony_blairs_emb.html (Jan. 31, 2007). 
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limited exemption has been criticized by the European Union as too tolerant of 
discrimination.30 
¶20 Of course, modern egalitarians do not limit the demands of equality to equal 
treatment by government.  Modern civil rights statutes properly reach private 
employment,31 housing,32 access for the disabled,33 and the like, typically applying the 
same standards to both government and private actors.  No more rigorous standard is 
applied to Title VII cases brought against government entities than to all but the very 
smallest of employers.34  This is a good thing.  In a society in which the private sector 
controls substantial amounts of access to social goods, it would greatly disadvantage 
disfavored groups if, due to private discrimination, they had access only to the resources 
controlled by government.  
¶21 More evidence of the triumph of equality over liberty comes from the public 
schools.  School officials have allowed students to wear T-shirts expressing support for 
gay rights, while suppressing speech by opponents of those rights.35  The justification for 
that censorship is rooted in equality: gay students would feel themselves denied an equal 
opportunity to take advantage of school when faced with such “attacks” on their 
identity.36 
¶22 It is sometimes said that religious exemptions that burden others are akin to 
establishments of religion; that persons adversely affected by the behaviors exempted 
from otherwise applicable statutory prohibitions must bear the cost of someone else’s 
religious observance.  It would follow that any exemption burdening partners to same-sex 
marriage would thus be coerced compliance with religious norms.  The cryptic opinion in 
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,37 invalidating an inflexible mandate of religious 
accommodation in the employment context, lends some support to this claim.  But, given 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,38 upholding a very broad religious 
institution exemption from the ban on religious discrimination in employment of Title 
VII, the broadest readings of Thornton—denying any religious accommodation—are 
implausible.  The reality is that there is no clear legal rule distinguishing between 
permissible and impermissible accommodation. 
¶23 Equality does not admit of halfway measures.  One is either equal or unequal. 
Speaking on gay marriage (as opposed to civil unions), one advocate recently said 
                                                 
30 European Commission, Commission Takes Legal Action Against UK in Gender and Employment 
Equality (Nov. 20, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/unitedkingdom/press/press_releases/2009/pr09146_en.htm 
(exemptions for religious employers to the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation are broader than permitted by the Union (directive 2000/78/EC)). 
31 E.g., Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2010). 
32 E.g., Fair Housing Act, Title VII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2010). 
33 E.g., Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2010). 
34 Title VII applies to all employers with fifteen or more employees, and New York’s ban on employment 
discrimination applies to employers of more than four people.  N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(5) (2010). 
35 Harper v. Poway, 445 F.3d 1166 (2006). 
36 See, e.g., Martha M. McCarthy, Student Expression that Collides With The Rights of Others: Should the 
Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone?, 240 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009); Brian Bilford, Harper’s Bazaar: The 
Marketplace of Ideas and Hate Speech, 4 STAN. J.L. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 447, 472 (2008) (“Few 
would argue against the Harper court’s lofty goal of protecting students from the pain caused by hate 
speech.”). 
37 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
38 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (employee fired because no longer in good standing with church operation of 
community center). 
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“[t]here is no such thing as a fraction of equality.  We want equal protection under law.”39 
Seen through the prism of individual liberty, it is hard to see why the states should 
systematically avoid burdening same-sex couples, no matter how lightly (recall that the 
proposed accommodation statute does not apply where gay couples cannot readily find 
alternative suppliers), at the expense of other liberties, including the ability of others to 
practice their faith.  But if the right to same-sex marriage sounds in equality, not liberty, 
and the right to equality is given preferential status, then the arguments against an 
exemption become plain.  
C. The Argument For Liberty 
¶24 I believe that if same-sex marriage rights are bottomed in liberty, religious 
exemption claims cannot be ignored.  One response to this suggestion is to deny that 
liberty includes the power to impose costs on others.  That is, one’s right to religious 
liberty does not include the power to impose personal religious beliefs on same-sex 
couples.  “Your liberty ends where my nose begins,” as the old adage has it.  This, 
however, raises the question of where one’s nose begins; that is, whose personal liberties 
are the starting points for the analysis?  It is one thing to say that a religious Jew, 
Catholic, or Mormon has no right to prohibit me from marrying someone of the same sex.  
It is quite another to demand that person recognize my union in violation of his beliefs; to 
say that I can compel a caterer with traditional religious beliefs to cater my same-sex 
wedding ceremony.40  If one starts with the caterer’s rights, it is perfectly cogent to argue 
that the liberty interest in same-sex marriage does not extend to the power to compel 
others to participate. 
¶25 Whose “nose” is impacted when the state, having recognized same-sex marriage, 
compels a small family-owned business to subsidize a same-sex spouse’s health 
insurance to the same extent as it subsidizes that of a heterosexual spouse, or tells a 
wedding photographer that she must accept an assignment at a same-sex wedding 
ceremony?  What is the “liberty” interest that the gay person has that may compel 
someone else to lend support to his or her decision to enter into a same-sex marriage?  
These examples demonstrate that, while equality may conclusively exclude claims for 
religious exemptions, liberty cannot. 
III. RELIGION IN PUBLIC LIFE 
¶26 Some same-sex marriage proponents’ refusal to consider religious liberty claims 
stems from a perception that religion has no place in “public” life, that is, outside one’s 
own home and place of worship.  
¶27 At first glance, this is a claim more acceptable in France, with its policy of lacite, 
than the American settlement of official, but benevolent, neutrality towards religion in the 
public sphere.  And, indeed, in most of Europe, equality claims generally trump religious 
                                                 
39 Apparently, the phrase was first used in a talk by Cleve Jones at the Commonwealth Club.  See Nelson 
Hernandez & Yamiche Alcindor, Making a Federal Case for Gay Rights, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/11/AR2009101100161.html.  
40 It is, of course, impermissible for the state to disfavor certain religious claims specifically because they 
are “retrogressive” or because other religious leaders believe them to be a distortion of religious teachings.  
Yet people who claim to be advocates of religious liberty sometimes make just these claims. 
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liberty ones when the two clash.41  Nevertheless, the claim that religion does not belong 
in the public sphere has been heard more frequently and in a variety of contexts in the 
United States in recent years,42 so it merits discussion.  
¶28 For example, in response to religious clashes between physicians and patients over 
abortion and end of life decisions, one encounters the argument that we live in a secular 
society, so medicine ought to be governed by secular rules only, and that religion has no 
place in the “public” practice of medicine.  Thus, the argument would follow that, 
whatever one’s religious objections to same-sex marriage, in a secular society these 
objections have no place in “public,” and they must not be expressed in ways that impact 
others. 
¶29 The popularity of this argument reflects, in part, the decreasing participation in 
religion in the country, particularly among the better-educated classes.  No doubt, too, 
this claim is a backlash against the excesses, real and imagined, of the Bush 
Administration and the so-called Religious Right.  However one defines the latter, it is 
true that some of its spokespersons have invited this backlash by the stridency of their 
discourse and political agenda.   
¶30 In Europe, efforts to forcibly privatize religion have garnered considerable force 
and enjoy the general imprimatur of the European Court of Human Rights.43  However, 
the put-religion-in-the-closet argument is difficult—no, largely impossible—to reconcile 
with the historic American understanding of religious liberty.  Unlike the French and 
other European settlements, the American settlement does not regard religious challenges 
to prevailing social norms as inherently dangerous, to be kept from any public 
expression.  For example, Muslim head scarves have been banned in France and 
Switzerland, yet are commonplace in the United States. 
¶31 One explanation for this difference may be that we have not known, by and large, 
Europe’s religious wars.44  Europe has experienced numerous organized slaughters of 
religious dissenters, from the English civil wars and the suppression of the Huguenots, to 
the persecution of the Roma, and, of course, the Holocaust.  Having witnessed first hand 
the devastation religious persecution can reap, Europe may be quick to silence religious 
claims of exemption from law and other societal norms.  Another explanation is the fact 
that European religious practice has been on the decline, even as far back as World War 
II.45  What’s politically possible in an increasingly secular Europe is not possible in the 
(so far) vastly more religious United States.  
                                                 
41 Various decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have upheld restrictions on Muslim women’s 
head coverings on the ground that the restrictions on liberty further the interest in gender equality.  See, 
e.g., Sahin v. Turkey, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8 (2005). 
42 This claim is quite prominent in Internet discussion-boards, especially with respect to same-sex marriage. 
See, e.g., Constitutional Democracy or Theocracy?—Same Sex Marriage: Separation of Church and State 
(Apr. 12, 2004), http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/equality/intrv120404.htm; Shannon L.C. Cate, Separation 
of Church and State=Same Sex Marriage (Oct. 29, 2008), 
http://www.babble.com/CS/blogs/strollerderby/archive/2008/10/29/separation-of-church-and-state-same-
sex-marriage.aspx. 
43 See Partisi v. Turkey, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (2003) (upholding ban on broadcasts of religious 
commercials). 
44 The Mormon Church might question this assertion, and so might Native Americans. 
45 See, albeit with a distinct point of view, Pope Benedict’s reflections on this in JOSEPH RATZINGER (POPE 
BENEDICT XVI) & MARCELLO PERA, WITHOUT ROOTS (2005).  See generally Loek Halman & Veerle 
Draulans, How Secular Is Europe, 57 BRIT. J. SOC. 263 (2006); Liliane Voye, Secularization in a Context of 
Advanced Modernity, 60 SOC. RELIGION 275 (1999). 
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¶32 If the in-the-closet approach to religion is not formally compatible with American 
church-state doctrine, it is also apparently incompatible with American economic 
practices.  The freedom to practice religious dissent in the United States is in good part a 
product of the fact that Americans have not allowed religion to intrude into commerce 
and public life, certainly not in modern times.  
¶33 We have not known, for example, the Protestant/Catholic troubles of Northern 
Ireland, which caused a religious-divide in the housing and employment market.46  By-
and-large Americans have not carried doctrinal or theological disputes over to the 
marketplace or the workplace.  One can say with near certainty that our laws and attitudes 
would be different if we had had an experience similar to Northern Ireland.  Or maybe 
the fact is that the true American religion is the pursuit of profit, in which case few would 
choose to take advantage of any religious exemption included in same-sex marriage 
legislation if it interfered with the ability to make a profit.  
¶34 It may also be that the GLBT community47 and those who practice more liberal 
faiths object to protection for traditional religious beliefs in the hope that a same-sex 
marriage law would leave such views too expensive to implement.  If this is the purpose 
of the opposition, legally mandated acceptance of same-sex marriages represents an 
unacceptable intrusion of government into an important intra-church dispute.  The intra-
church dispute over the acceptance of same-sex marriage is one that, at bottom, plumbs 
one’s attitude toward the binding authority of religious texts, their interpretation, 
religious traditions, and the question of whether God imposes norms that impose heavy 
burdens on people.  The government has no place deliberately intruding into this dispute 
beyond offering legal protection for the liberal view in its own spheres. 
IV. RESPECT FOR MORAL CHOICES 
¶35 There is one final argument sometimes heard regarding same-sex marriage.  It is 
the argument that respect for other people’s moral choices prohibits tolerance of the 
refusal to facilitate those choices.  The argument has two parts: one supporting moral 
autonomy and the other making religious claims. 
¶36 The moral autonomy claim is the belief that the moral choices of citizens may not 
be questioned by other citizens, at least not in ways that move beyond the theoretical. 
One may not confront an individual’s moral choice directly, or impede him or her in 
acting on that moral choice.  This, however, is to confuse immunity from legal 
impediments to carrying out one’s moral choices, on the one hand, with a ban on 
criticism and the refusal to assist in the carrying out of other’s moral choice on the other 
hand.  The two are not the same.  The former is often permissible in a liberal democracy; 
the latter is at odds with it.  Yet contemporary political discourse often confuses the two.  
Respect for the moral autonomy of an individual demands that one not be forced to act in 
a way that goes against moral choices, such as the choice not to accept same-sex 
marriage. 
                                                 
46 That, at least, is the standard story.  For partially dissenting views, see Vani K. Borooah, et al., Catholic 
Protestant Income Differences, 41 REV. INCOME & WEALTH 41 (1995); Christopher Hewitt, Catholic 
Grievances, Catholic Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland During the Civil Rights Period: a 
Reconsideration, 32 BRIT. J. SOC. 362 (1981). 
47 The “GLBT community” refers to Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender persons and those who 
support them. 
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¶37 The second part of the argument, the claim about religion, attempts to expound on 
the meaning of religion and the definition of sin.  This argument states that it is no sin to 
help someone else carryout, under coercion of law, a legal and (arguably) moral act that 
one believes to be a sin.  The basis of this argument, which can be traced back to John 
Locke’s Letter on Toleration, is either that officially coerced activity is no more sinful 
than any coerced act which would not be a sin, or that moral responsibility lies solely 
with the person committing the primary evil.  Therefore, the argument goes, the 
recognition of a same-sex marriage, which one finds sinful, would not itself be a sin. 
Many religions teach otherwise, so to assert this is to stand in the place of religious 
leaders and assert a religious proposition.  Such blatant interference with religion should 
not be tolerated.  
V. CONCLUSION 
¶38 As demonstrated above, there is no legal justification for a religious exemption if 
the right to same-sex marriage is based in equality.  At the same time, there are various 
and compelling non-legal arguments for the appreciation of religious liberty.  In the end, 
we must decide whether equality must make room for liberty (and liberty for equality).  
The take-no-prisoners approach to politics that categorizes so much of the contemporary 
debate makes it unlikely that any middle ground will emerge—and, in fact, this is how 
the debate is proceeding.  This is unfortunate, as I have demonstrated that a qualified 
religious exemption may preserve religious liberty without placing too large a burden on 
the equality of same-sex couples. 
¶39 Beyond the same-sex marriage debate, some of the most common and divisive 
issues on the legislative agenda implicate the clash between equality (e.g., universal 
medical care, campaign finance limitations, etc.) and liberty (e.g., conscience clauses, 
objections to compulsory purchases of insurance, etc.).  Neither proponents of equality 
nor of liberty seem prepared to acknowledge that, while these two values are sometimes 
in conflict, both are valuable and should be protected.  Sometimes one or the other will 
need to yield, but often there is some way to maximize both.  Too many people prefer the 
simplicity of a mono-polar tradition to a complex one.  That is too bad. 
